The importance of time in referee home bias due to social pressure. Evidence from Spanish football by Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo et al.
  1 
 
 
FEG WORKING PAPER SERIES 
DOCUMENTOS DE TRABAJO FEG 
 
 
F FE EG G   W WO OR RK KI IN NG G   P PA AP PE ER RS S   S SE ER RI IE ES S   
Documentos de trabajo de la Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales 
de la Universidad de Granada 
 
 






" The importance of time in referee home bias due to social pressure. 
Evidence from Spanish football " 
Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo Francisco González-Gómez, Jorge Guardiola ,  
RESPETANDO COLOR 







BIBLIOTECA FACULTAD DE CIENCIAS 
ECONÓMICAS Y EMPRESARIALES 
http://www.ugr.es/~biblio/biblioteca_ugr/bibliotecas_centros/economicas/index.html 
   2 
The importance of time in referee home bias due to social 
pressure. Evidence from Spanish football 
Andrés J. Picazo-Tadeo. Universidad de Valencia. Campus de Tarongers. 46022 Valencia, 
Spain. E-mail: ajpicazo@uv.es; Web: http://www.uv.es/ajpicazo/Investigacion.htm 
Francisco González-Gómez. Universidad de Granada. Campus de Cartuja. 18071 Granada, 
Spain. E-mail: fcojose@ugr.es; Web: http://www.ugr.es/~fcojose/Investigacion.htm 
Jorge Guardiola. Universidad de Granada. Campus de Cartuja. 18071 Granada, Spain.  
E-mail: jguardiola@ugr.es 
 
Abstract. This paper analyses referee home bias due to social pressure with data from the 
matches played in the First Division of the Spanish football league between the 2002/03 and 
2009/10 seasons. Finally, our main conclusion is that the time the referee has to make a deci-
sion does affect the final outcome; while there is no referee home bias when a free kick is 
awarded, in the case of booking players, when the referee has more time to make a decision, 
social pressure can influence the final outcome in favour of the home team. 
Keywords. Social pressure; crowd effect; referee home bias; sports economics. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Examining the performance of a referee to determine whether or not there is a referee home 
bias is not an easy task. Some incidents during a match can be interpreted very differently. 
Occasionally, when a player falls to the ground after an incident, some interpret there has 
been a foul and others that the player did so intentionally to earn a free kick. As regards free 
kicks, the referee has a certain degree of discretionary power to decide whether or not to book 
a player and, when applicable, whether the card shown is yellow or red. Further evidence that 
during the course of a match there are incidents that are difficult to interpret is when the same 
incident is repeated several times on television and commentators and viewers alike discuss 
the referee’s decision without, on many occasions, reaching an agreement.   3 
The referee must be impartial and make decisions by applying the rules. However, the in-
terpretation of some situations during a match and the lack of precision of the human eye 
leave room for either conscious or unconscious referee bias in favour of the home team. Such 
referee bias is largely due to social pressure. 
In football, researches agree that referee bias is yet another factor that is part of a home-
advantage effect. The majority of studies that have addressed this issue to date analyse the 
English case (Nevill et al., 1996; Boyko et al., 2007; Dawson et al., 2007; Rickman and Witt, 
2008; Buraimo et al., 2010), although there is also evidence on the German league (Sutter and 
Cochera, 2004; Dohmen, 2008; Buraimo et al., 2010), the Italian league (Scoppa, 2008; Pet-
tersson-Lidbom and Priks, 2010) and the Spanish league (Garicano et al., 2005). In addition, 
there have been studies based on data from European competitions (Dawson and Dobson, 
2010) and also some that combine information from different competitions (Page and Page, 
2010). 
Two main types of approaches have been employed to study referee home bias. In the first 
place, the relationship between social pressure and the injury time added on by the referee is 
analysed (Domen, 2008; Rickman and Witt, 2008). When the home team is losing and by a 
short margin, the referee tends to prolong injury time. In the second place, some papers have 
examined the relationship between social pressure and the disciplinary measures taken by the 
referee (Boyko et al., 2007; Dawson and Dobson, 2010). In this case, we would expect social 
pressure to tilt the balance of disciplinary measures taken in favour of the home team. 
This article follows the second line of research and aims to study whether social pressure 
can explain referee bias in favour of the home side when it comes to awarding free kicks and 
booking players. Prior knowledge of systematic behaviour on behalf of referees in favour of 
home teams due to social pressure is important, as it can condition a manager’s strategy and 
also players’ attitude on the pitch.   4 
The research is carried out using data from the First Division matches of the Spanish Pro-
fessional Football League played between the 2002/03 and 2009/10 seasons, both inclusive. 
In Spanish football, the home advantage effect seems to be important (Pollard and Gómez, 
2009) and, which could be related to the existence of a home bias. Our first contribution to the 
literature is the way in which we analyse referee home bias, distinguishing whether it exists in 
the number of free kicks awarded or the cards players are shown. In the second place, we in-
corporate variables to control for certain features of the style of play of the teams that may 
influence the referee’s decision to award a free kick, which have not been considered in pre-
vious papers. The main conclusion is that the time a referee has to make a decision could be a 
relevant factor in the explanation of referee home bias. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on referee 
bias in football. Section 3 explains the methodology. Section 4 presents the data and results, 
while Section 5 summarises and concludes. 
2. BACKGROUND 
According to the literature, referee bias is one of the causes of the home-advantage effect. 
There are two main ways the referee may favour the home team and/or jeopardise the away 
team, namely penalties and bookings (Nevill et al., 1996; Downward and Jones, 2007; Boyko 
et al., 2007) and the time added on at the end of a match (Garicano et al., 2005; Sutter and 
Cochera, 2004). In addition, referee bias could also influence match results, for which reason 
some papers have studied goal difference to analyse this bias (Page and Page, 2010). 
Furthermore, referee home bias can be due to social pressure from two points of view. The 
first factor is psychological, whereby the referee may be influenced unconsciously by home 
team supporters. Referee bias is influenced by home spectators’ ability to intimidate and the   5 
different way that each referee reacts to social pressure (Boyko et al., 2007; Page and Page, 
2010). 
Secondly, from an economic perspective, the Agency Theory explains that a referee could 
favour a home team consciously (Sutter and Koecher, 2004; Rickman and Witt, 2008) for two 
reasons. On the one hand, referees would seek to content their employer, the Football Asso-
ciation in each country, which is responsible for appointing referees for matches, taking deci-
sions regarding the division referees should be in and, moreover, is authorised to take disci-
plinary action against referees. On the other hand, during the match the referee may try to 
please the crowd, which will exert pressure in order to obtain the best result for their team. In 
this scenario, permissive or imperfect monitoring on behalf of the Football Association can be 
an incentive for referees to take decisions that favour the home team. 
In previous research, several variables have been employed to measure social pressure and 
explain its influence on referee bias. Some studies uphold that the larger the crowd, measured 
by the number of spectators at matches, the greater the social pressure on the referee (Scoppa, 
2008; Page and Page, 2010). For other authors, however, the most relevant variable is crowd 
density, measured by  the  number of  spectators in  relation  to the capacity  of the  stadium 
(Boyko et al., 2007); in this case, the important aspect would be the psychological effect that 
empty  seats  could  have  (Smith,  2003).  One  extreme  case is  that analysed  by  Pettersson-
Lidbom and Priks (2010) when some Italian football teams had to temporarily play home 
matches in empty stadiums in 2007. 
Similarly, some studies have used crowd noise to measure social pressure, considering that 
this variable is a better indication of home team supporters’ powers of intimidation (Nevill et 
al., 2002). Finally, the closeness of spectators to the pitch, measured by the presence of an 
athletics track between the crowd and the pitch, has also been used to approximate social 
pressure (Dohmen, 2008; Buraimo et al., 2010; Dawson and Dobson, 2010).   6 
The papers that have analysed referee bias in terms of free kicks awarded have also in-
cluded representative control variables, in the majority of cases, to cater for the difference in 
quality of the teams playing each other. The reason is that managers could transmit to players 
the unsporting strategy of committing more fouls to stop opposing team attacks and reduce 
the amount of time the ball is in play, as the latter normally enjoy more possession of the ball 
(Dawson et al., 2007; Boyko et al., 2007). In order to account for the difference in quality, 
some papers introduce historical data that have nothing to do with the competition in each 
match. One option is to construct a variable that compares goals scored and received by the 
rival teams (Boyko et al. 2007; Page and Page, 2010). However, Dawson et al. (2007) and 
Buraimo et al. (2010) opt for a measure of the probability of the home team winning, drawing 
or the away team winning. Finally, Dawson and Dobson (2010) build up an index that follows 
the UEFA seeding and drawing procedures in the two European competitions. 
 
3. DATA AND MODEL SPECIFICATION 
This study is based on a set of data obtained from the Football Year-book (Guía de la Liga) by 
Marca, the leading sports newspaper in Spain according to market share, published between 
2003 and 2010. The data refer to matches in the First Division of the Spanish Football League 
played between the 2002/03 and 2009/2010 seasons, both inclusive. During this period, 3,040 
matches were played, although due to a lack of information, our sample only includes 2,651 
matches. Furthermore, we have obtained written permission to use the data and the study has 
been approved by the Ethics Committee in Research of the University of Granada in Spain. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables. 
***Please, insert table 1 around here***   7 
In order to analyse the possible existence of referee home bias due to social pressure, two 
variables have been constructed, both representing the disciplinary measures taken by refe-
rees. It is important to clarify that, as in Boyko et al. (2007) and Page and Page (2010), both 
variables are expressed as the difference between the home and away teams in order to ascer-
tain whether or not referees treat two teams in the same match differently. Other papers have 
studied the determinants of free kicks awarded to the home team separately, on the one hand, 
and those awarded to the away team, on the other. The drawback of this method is, however, 
that it fails to take into account the different attitude the referee has towards the two rival 
teams in the same match. 
The first of our variables to measure referee home bias expresses the difference in the 
number of home team fouls and away team fouls in one same match. The variable is called 
FOUL DIFFERENCE. As far as we know, only Pettersson-Lidbom and Priks (2010) have used 
this variable. The second variable is the RATIO DISCIPLINARY POINTS DIFFERENCE, which meas-
ures the difference between the ratio of disciplinary points of the home team and the away 









whereby for a team i, the numerator is constructed by adding one point per yellow card re-
ceived and two points per red card received (Dawson et al., 2007 and Dawson and Dobson, 
2010), while the denominator denotes the number of fouls committed by the team. 
As far as we are aware, considering this variable to explain referee home bias constitutes a 
contribution to the literature that makes it possible to implicitly consider that there are two 
stages in the process of showing a card. Firstly, the referee must indicate a foul and then de-
cide whether or not to book the player who committed it. Our variable RATIO DISCIPLINARY 
POINTS DIFFERENCE does not analyse the direct relationship between social pressure and cards   8 
shown, but rather the influence of social pressure when, after a free kick has been awarded, 
the referee must decide whether or not the foul warrants a card. Directly analysing the rela-
tionship between social pressure and bookings could lead to incorrect results due to ignoring 
that the number of bookings and fouls might be correlated.  
In order to capture the possible influence of social pressure on referee decisions, we have 
included three variables. The number of spectators at the stadium, variable CROWD, the per-
centage of the stadium that is occupied, variable OCCUPANCY, and the variable ATHLETICS 
TRACK, which is a dummy variable equal to 1 if there is an athletics track between the crowd 
and the pitch and 0 otherwise. Initially, a larger crowd, a higher stadium occupancy rate and 
less distance between the spectators and the pitch could be expected to increase the social 
pressure on the referee. Likewise, in order to capture how easily influenced the referee is by 
social pressure, we have included a variable that represents referee experience, variable EX-
PERIENCE.  As  in  Boyko  et  al.  (2007),  referee  experience  is  measured  by  the  number  of 
matches refereed in the First Division of Spanish football. A more experienced referee should 
be less submissive to social pressure (Pollard and Gómez, 2009). 
Furthermore, other factors apart from the possible difference in referee criteria for the 
home and away team could influence referee decisions in a match. Our paper further contrib-
utes to the literature by including a series of control variables that, as far as we know, have 
not been used in previous studies. Instead of the variables based on historical data used in 
other studies, we include a couple of variables representing how the match unfolds to capture 
the type of football the teams play. 
In the first place, the variable POSSESSION SCORE DIFFERENCE which represents the differ-
ence in the percentage of ball possession between the home team and the away team. It is rea-
sonable to believe that the more time a team has the ball, the less fouls it will commit and, 
more than likely, the more fouls the players from the opposing team will commit. In the sec-  9 
ond place, the variable SHOTS  SCORE  DIFFERENCE represents the difference in shots at goal 
between the home team and the away team and aims to capture the differing attacking tenden-
cies of both teams. Occasionally, a more attacking mentality is not reflected by having greater 
ball possession, but can also explain why that team commits less fouls. 
 
4. METHODOLOGICAL NOTE, RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
4.1. Methodological note and results 
In order to analyse the possible existence of referee home bias in Spanish professional foot-
ball and given the characteristics of our sample, we have estimated a panel data linear regres-
sion model. In particular, in view of the fact that some of our explanatory variables do no 
change over time, we have estimated two random effects panel data regressions for the deter-
minants of FOUL  DIFFERENCE and RATIO  DISCIPLINARY  POINTS  DIFFERENCE, respectively. In 
both cases we consider a model with home team effects and another model with referee ef-
fects. The estimations have been performed with Stata 11 software and the results are pre-
sented in Tables 2 and 3. 
The results in terms of possible referee home bias where the number of fouls are concerned 
reveal that none of the variables representing social pressure exerts a statistically significant 
influence on the number of free kicks a referee awards the home and away team (Table 2). 
Referee experience does not appear to influence the number of free kicks awarded either. 
Only the control variables POSSESSION SCORE DIFFERENCE AND SHOTS SCORE DIFFERENCE are 
statistically significant and register the expected sign. Therefore, having more possession of 
the ball and being more attacking on the pitch results in a team incurring in less fouls than its 
rival. Consequently, there does not appear to be a referee bias in favour of the home team in 
terms of free kicks awarded.   10 
***Please, insert table 2 around here*** 
Notwithstanding, after indicating a foul, the referee must decide whether or not the foul 
warrants a card and, where applicable, whether the card is yellow or red. It is reasonable to 
believe that, once a foul has been indicated, and due to social pressure, there might be a refe-
ree home bias in terms of the cards players are shown. Normally, the referee has more time to 
decide whether or not to book a player than to indicate a foul. Due to play having been inter-
rupted, the referee can consult the line judge, but can also be more greatly influenced by the 
pressure from home team players and supporters. 
Table 3 presents the results of the estimations performed to analyse the possible existence 
of a referee home bias in bookings per free kick awarded (variable RATIO DISCIPLINARY POINTS 
DIFFERENCE). It is worth clarifying that in this case, the explanatory variables POSSESSION 
SCORE DIFFERENCE and SHOTS SCORE DIFFERENCE have been excluded as ball possession and 
an attacking strategy can influence the number of free kicks awarded, but never how a player 
is penalised with a yellow or red card once a foul has been indicated. These results show that 
the variable CROWD, which reflects the number of people at a match, is statistically significant 
and has the expected sign. In other words, this result suggests that once the referee has indi-
cated a free kick, there is a referee bias in favour of the home side, and a referee is therefore 
more likely to book a player from the away team. None of the remaining variables considered 
in the model is statistically significant at the standard confidence levels. 
***Please, insert table 3 around here*** 
4.2. Discussion 
The results of this research cannot confirm, at least in the period under analysis, that Spanish 
football referees have been biased, due to social pressure, in favour of the home team when it 
comes to awarding free kicks. However, once a free kick has been awarded, there does appear   11 
to be a referee home bias in the punishment a player receives for committing a foul. Our re-
sults suggest that when there is a large crowd in the stadium, the referee tends to find it easier 
to book away team players than home players. 
Together, both results suggest that there may be differences in the decision making process 
of the referee that are dependent on reaction time. When the decision has to be taken immedi-
ately, that is, in the case of indicating a foul, social pressure does not influence the referee’s 
decision. The referee is probably too involved in following play to be influenced by the crowd 
in such a short space of time. Conversely, when the referee has more time to take a decision, 
as in the case of punishing players with a card, the probability of social pressure having an 
influence increases. 
Evidence of a referee home bias where bookings are concerned had already been found in 
the research by Boyko et al. (2007), Dawson et al. (2007), Downward and Jones (2007) and 
Dawson and Dobson (2010). However, the results of our research go one step further. At least 
in the Spanish case, we know that referee bias towards booking away team players is not 
brought about by a bias in the number of free kicks awarded, but occurs after a foul is indi-
cated. What happens during the moments after a free-kick is awarded and particularly, the 
pressure the crowd is capable of exerting can have a significant effect on the referee’s deci-
sion so that it favours the home side. 
The recommendation for football team executives is therefore straightforward: they must 
do everything they can to get supporters to come to the stadium. This could be crucial when 
the home team does not have high quality players. Due to there being signs of a referee home 
bias towards showing cards to away team players for the fouls they commit, when the home 
side is weaker, it would be in their best interests for the match to be scrappy with a lot of free 
kicks being awarded. A match in which there are many bookings could negatively affect the   12 
strategy of the potentially stronger team, the visiting team, especially if one of their players is 
sent off. 
Finally, it is worth highlighting that referee experience is not a significant variable when 
explaining referee home bias in either of the two relationships studied. This result could be 
interpreted as a sign of a good referee selection and promotion policy on behalf of the Spanish 
Football Association. When a decision is made to promote a referee to the First Division of 
Spanish football, referees are mature enough not to be influenced by social pressure, or at 
least not to a greater extent than their more experienced colleagues. 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This research analyses referee home bias due to social pressure with data from the First Divi-
sion of Spanish football between the 2002/03 and 2009/10 seasons. The aim is to assess 
whether the pressure exerted by local supporters who go to football matches influences two 
referee decisions: free kicks awarded and players booked. 
Our contribution to the existing literature in this field of research is two-fold. In the first 
place, home referee bias in terms of bookings is analysed taking into account the prior indica-
tion of a foul. Previous research has analysed referee bias in bookings directly, ignoring the 
possibility of there being a relationship between fouls indicated and cards shown. The second 
contribution is the inclusion of control variables representing the amount of ball possession 
that teams enjoy and whether they are more or less attacking, instead of variables based on the 
past behaviour of home and away teams considered by previous studies. 
The main result obtained is that the time a referee has to take a decision can be an impor-
tant factor when explaining referee home bias. While we find no empirical evidence to sup-
port referee bias in the number of free kicks awarded, after a foul is indicated there does ap-
pear to be a referee home bias in terms of penalising the player that has committed the foul by   13 
booking him. The pressure that local supporters exert moments after a foul has been indicated 
can be a relevant factor in the referee’s final decision. 
Finally, one recommendation for football team executives is to encourage their supporters 
to fill their stadiums, particularly when facing teams that are initially higher quality. Fans 
should exert social pressure, particularly during the moments after a referee indicates the 
away team has committed a foul. Likewise, from the point of view of those responsible for 
organising the referees, it would be recommendable for this decision to be taken by a referee 
far from the place where the pressure is being exerted. New technologies make it possible for 
this type of solution to be applied in practice. As a result, bias in the decision to book a player, 
which can change the result of a match, could be avoided. 
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Table 1. Sample description 
Variable  Mean  Standard 
deviation  Maximum Minimum
FOULS DIFFERENCE  0.167  6.469  26.000  -24.000 
RATIO DISCIPLINARY POINTS DIFFER-
ENCE  -0.029  0.139  0.916  -0.700 
CROWD (thousand)    28.2  17.9  98.0  5.0 
OCCUPANCY (%)  0.742  0.184  1.000  0.167 
RUNNING TRACK (dummy)  0.150  0.357  1.000  0.000 
EXPERIENCE (games)  99.6  65.2  262.0  0.0 
POSSESSION SCORE DIFFERENCE (%)  3.267  16.498  58.600  -62.500 
SHOTS SCORE DIFFERENCE (%)  2.920  6.873  31.000  -21.000 
Table 2. Referee home bias in fouls indicated (the dependent variable is FOUL 
DIFFERENCE) 
Variable  Home team effects  Referee effects 




OCCUPANCY  -0.18524  
(1.15055) 
-0.09562 
(0.76408)   16 





























2  0.099  0.180 
Observations  2,651  2,651 
*** Significant at 1%; 
** Significant at 2.5%; 
* Significant at 5%. 
Standard errors are in brackets.   17 
Table 3. Referee home bias in bookings (the dependent variable is RATIO 
DISCIPLINARY POINTS DIFFERENCE) 
Variable  Home team 




























2  0.211  0.042 
Observations  2,651  2,651 
*** Significant at 1%; 
** Significant at 2.5%; 
* Significant at 5%. 
Standard errors are in brackets. 
 
 
 